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I. INTRODUCTION
The extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws has long posed a per-
plexing problem for the United States, foreign governments, and the
international business community., Attempts to apply U.S. laws in
cases involving foreign entities often pit U.S. policies and interests
against the policies and interests of the United States' trading part-
ners. 2 Unless the trading nations reach a consensus on antitrust poli-
cies, American courts will continue to face the difficult task of
determining whether to exercise jurisdiction in cases implicating for-
eign law and activity.
3
One judicial approach to this problem is to weigh the need to up-
hold U.S. antitrust laws and redress injured plaintiffs against the inter-
ests of foreign governments.4 At some point in this balancing process,
U.S. interests are sufficiently weak, and foreign interests sufficiently
strong, to render judicial remedies in U.S. courts inappropriate. 5 The
search for the definitive point at which this balance lies has created
tension in international antitrust litigation. 6 Increasing foreign trade
1. See generally Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extratern-
torialJurisdiction, 98 I-ARv. L. REv. 1310 (1985).
2. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 916
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (allowing airline industry suit to proceed despite British government
and court refusal to permit discovery); In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Con-
tract Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 996 (10th Cir. 1977) (noting that in antitrust matters compli-
ance with the laws of one country may provide basis for prosecution in another).
3. See I BARRY E. HAwK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL AN-
TrrRusT: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 20-29 (1991) (delineating extraterritorial policy impli-
cations currently faced by United States).
4. See, e.g., Industrial Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1982) (implementing Timberlane test to assess conflict
between American and Indonesian law); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (adopting Timberlane test with modifications);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985) (formulating three-prong test that considers whether American
interests are sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis foreign interests, to justify an assertion of extra-
territorial jurisdiction). But see Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 954 (rejecting balancing of
government interests test as political, not judicial, function).
5. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 609, (recognizing that American interests may be
weaker than foreign interests in some cases).
6. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 956 (exercising jurisdiction over British air-
line and causing impasse between United States and British governments). Additional
problems are created when U.S. courts choose to rely solely on domestic law and inter-
ests. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 165 (1895) (proposing that in conflict of
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will continue to compound existing problems until an internationally
acceptable jurisdictional rule is established.
The United States Supreme Court recently illustrated the inade-
quacy and continued confusion of existing approaches in determining
whether courts should exercise jurisdiction in antitrust cases involving
foreign activities. In Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,7 the question
presented was whether certain antitrust claims against London reinsur-
ers should have been dismissed as an improper application of the Sher-
man Act to conduct by foreign corporations. 8 Hartford represents the
Court's most recent decision on the application of U.S. antitrust laws
to non-Americans.
The Court decided inter alia,9 in a 5-4 decision,0 that U.S. antitrust
laws apply to conduct by non-Americans that occurs outside the United
States if said conduct is intended to, and does, produce, a substantial
effect in the United States.' The Court stated that notions of interna-
laws situations it is doubtful as to which law should prevail and whenever doubt does
exist, the court that decides will prefer its own laws to those of another country).
As a result, foreign nationals and states often reject the soundness of U.S. extrater-
ritorial adjudication as an exportation of unwelcome American economic and political
values. See 1 HAwi,, supra note 3, at 30 (noting potential negative foreign reaction to
panoply of U.S. antitrust laws having broad extraterritorial reach).
7. 113 S. Ct. 2891 (1993).
8. Id. at 2908.
9. The Court also held that domestic insurers did not lose their McCarran-Fergu-
son Act immunity from federal regulation simply because they agreed or acted with
foreign reinsurers allegedly not regulated by state law. Id. at 2892. This Comment fo-
cuses solely on the application of U.S. antitrust laws to foreign conduct by foreign
parties.
10. Justices Souter, Rehnquist, Blackmun, White, and Stevens comprised the major-
ity in Hartford Justices Scalia, O'Connor, Thomas and Kennedy joined in the dissent.
11. Id. at 2910.
1994]
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tional comityi2 "would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in
the circumstances alleged here."'S
The Court's analysis focused primarily on section 402 of the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.14 Under this Act, the
Sherman Act' 5 does not apply to conduct involving nonimport foreign
trade or commerce, unless "such conduct has a direct, substantial, and
reasonably foreseeable effect" on domestic or import commerce.1 6
Finding the conduct had a direct effect on the U.S., the Court ruled
that unless foreign law requires foreign citizens or corporations to act
in a manner prohibited by U.S. antitrust laws, or unless compliance
with the laws of both countries is otherwise impossible, self-imposed
restraints on the exercise ofjurisdiction based on international comity
are inapplicable.1
7
12. Although this Comment focuses only on the courts' authority to regulate extra-
territorial conduct, comity plays a role in these decisions. Comity is the idea that courts
of one state or jurisdiction recognize the laws of another state orjurisdiction as a matter
of deference and mutual respect rather than out of obligation. BLACK'S LAw DICTION-
ARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). In conflicts with foreign jurisdictions, comity seeks to reconcile
the territoriality or sovereignty of U.S. laws with the need to consider foreign laws. Eu-
GENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.4, at 12-13 (1984).
Historically, U.S. courts have expressed a variety of opinions regarding the issue of
comity. Initially, "foreign judgments [were] never reexamined unless the aid of [U.S.]
courts [was] asked to carry them into effect. The foreign judgment [was] held to be only
prima facie evidence of the demand." Id. § 24.33, at 961-62 (citations omitted). Re-
cently, however, U.S. courts have increasingly recognized the role of comity in foreign
litigation. 1 JAMES ATWOOD & KINGMAN BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS
ABROAD § 2.19, at 38 (1st ed. 1961).
Historically, consideration of foreign views was apparently considered unpatriotic;
this is no longer the case. Indeed, federal courts have encouraged the consideration of
comity in antitrust enforcement. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597,
613 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985). Cf In re Uranium Antitrust
Litig., 617 F.2d 597 (7th Cir. 1980) (evidencing less enthusiasm toward the considera-
tion of comity approach). Determining exactly how to incorporate foreign views with
American interests is an issue with which U.S. courts are currently struggling. For a
good discussion of the comity analysis, see Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Hart-
ford. 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2911 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
14. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1992). See infra part II.B.2.
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1992). See infra part II.B.1.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (a) (1992). See infra part II.B.1-2 for a discussion of the rele-
vant portions of the Sherman Act and the Foreign Trade and Antitrust Improvements
Act applicable to Hartford.
17. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2910-11. No conflict exists for these purposes, according
to the Court, "where a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with the
laws of both." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e (1987)). According to the majority, the only substantial
question relative to whether the Court should have refrained from exercising jurisdic-
tion under the Sherman Act is whether "there is in fact a true conflict between domestic
and foreign law." 113 S. Ct. at 2910 (citing Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale
v. United States District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)). Since the defendants did not
1112 [Vol. 20
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Justice Scalia argued for the dissent that under the factors set forth
in section 403 of the Restatement (Third) The Foreign Relations Law
of the United States,1t a nation having a basis for jurisdiction must
refrain from exercising that jurisdiction if such an exercise would be
unreasonable.19 Justice Scalia argued that the majority "completely
misinterpreted"20 the Restatement (Third).21 He also characterized
the majority's holding that no true conflict exists "unless compliance
with United States law would constitute a violation of another country's
law"22 as a "breathtakingly broad proposition" that contradicts estab-
lished case law. 23 The dissent predicted that the majority's holding
"will bring the Sherman Act and other laws into sharp and unnecessary
conflict with the legitimate interests of other countries-particularly
our closest trading partners."24
This Comment explores the implications of the Hartford decision in
relation to the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. The Comment
first outlines the historical development of U.S. antitrust laws by look-
ing at both the Sherman Act and the Foreign Trade and Antitrust Im-
provements Act of 1982.25 This Comment then develops a perspective
argue that British law required them to act in some manner prohibited by U.S. law, or
claim that compliance with both laws was impossible, the Court held that there was not
sufficient conflict to refuse the exercise ofjurisdiction. Id. at 2910-11.
18. Under section 403(2) of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAw OF THE UNITED STATES (1987), the reasonableness of such an exercise ofjurisdic-
tion turns, in part, on the following factors:
(a) the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory of [the reg-
ulating state];
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activ-
ity to be regulated;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance or regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities,
and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally ac-
cepted... ;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
Id. § 403(2) (a)-(c), (g)-(h).
19. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2921. Justice Scalia commented:
Rarely would these factors point more clearly against the application of United
States law .... I think it unimaginable that an assertion of legislative jurisdic-
tion by the United States would be considered reasonable, and therefore it is
inappropriate to assume, in the absence of statutory indication to the contrary,
that Congress has made such an assertion.
Id.
20. Id. at 2922.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 2921-22.
23. Id. at 2922.
24. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2922.
25. See infra part II.A-B.
19941 1113
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on the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws.2 6 The Comment
then examines the Hartford decision and concludes by identifying sev-
eral questions and consequences left unanswered by the majority's
opinion in Hartford,27 and which future litigants must consider.
II. HisTORic DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAw
A. Background
The term antitrust refers to a fluid set of national policies originally
designed in response to the emergence of American big business. 28
Antitrust violations usually stem from unlawful restraints of trade, price
discrimination, price fixing, and monopolies. 29 The principal federal
antitrust acts are the Sherman Act,So the Clayton Act,31 the Federal
Trade Commission Act,5 2 and the Robinson-Patman Act.53 In addi-
tion, most states have their own antitrust acts.3 4
Antitrust laws initially reflected broad, value-based policies which
typified the countries' and the enacting Congresses' distaste and dis-
trust of American business.3S However, in the 1970s, courts began to
cap the growing number of antitrust constraints. 6 This curtailment
peaked in the 1980s.37 In 1981, the Justice Department proclaimed
that antitrust policies should be aimed only at eliminating inefficient
transactions.5 8 Further, the Department asserted that few transactions
are actually inefficient or otherwise deserving of attention because the
market is a capable barometer of such behavior.3 9 Since that time, the
government has focused antitrust enforcement efforts primarily on
monopolization40 and cartel formation.4
1
26. See infra part II.C.
27. See infra part III.A.
28. ELEANOR M. Fox & LAWRENCE A. SuLLrvAN, ANTITRUST I (West 1989).
29. Id. at 28.
30. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1992).
31. Id. §§ 12, 13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 (1992); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1992).
32, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1992).
33. Id. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1992).
34. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 325D.49-D.66 (1992) (codifying Minnesota Antitrust
Law of 1971).
35. See Fox, supra note 28, at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. (following the lead of the Chicago school and preeminent economists like
Judge Posner).
39. Id.
40. Fox, supra note 28, at 2. Monopolization violating the Sherman Act occurs
when persons combine or aspire to exclude competitors from part of trade or com-
merce, providing they have power, intent, and purpose to exclude actual or potential
competition. Davidson v. Kansas City Star Co., 202 F. Supp. 613, 617 (W.D. Mo. 1962).
41. A cartel is defined as "[a] combination of producers of any product joined to-
gether to control its production, sale, and price, so as to obtain a monopoly and restrict
1114 [Vol. 20
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B. Antitrust Regulatory Acts
1. The Sherman Act
The Sherman Act42 is a fundamental component of the economic
policy of the United States. The purpose of the Sherman Act is to pre-
serve "free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade."43 Free
competition theoretically promotes efficient resource allocation, low
prices and equality. 44 In order to effectuate these purposes, the Act
provides causes of action to the government and private persons in-
jured directly or indirectly by unlawful restraints of trade.45 Moreover,
the Act seeks to eradicate anticompetitive conduct occurring in inter-
state or international commerce.4 6
Theoretically, then, when foreign corporations or U.S. subsidiaries
located abroad violate U.S. antitrust laws, they should be treated no
competition in any particular industry or commodity. Such exist primarily in Europe,
being restricted in [the] United States by antitrust laws. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 215
(6th ed. 1990).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1992). SenatorJohn Sherman introduced the Act and it be-
came law in 1890. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTI-
TRUST LAW 40-54 (1985) (discussing the policy and legislative history behind Sherman
Act); LAWRENCE A. SuLLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTIrrRUsr 1-17 (1977) (discuss-
ing economic rationale and historical developments of Sherman Act).
This Comment focuses primarily on sections 1 and 2 of the Act. Section 1 pro-
vides: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal .. . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. 1994). Section 2 of the Act provides
that "every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
felony.. .. " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1992).
43. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Scholars have identi-
fied several policies as the basis for domestic antitrust laws. These include: 1) to pro-
mote competition and the benefits of competition, which are efficient resource
allocation, lower prices, and premiums on innovation; 2) to reduce government regula-
tion of the economy; 3) to provide a preference for decentralized decision making
instead of economic or political power concentrations; 4) to provide maximum free-
dom of opportunity for businesses and customers; 5) to provide a standard of fair busi-
ness conduct. See I HAWK, supra note 3, at 1-10 (listing economic, social, and political
justifications for domestic application of the Sherman Act). See also CARL KAYSEN &
DAVID F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY. AN ECONOMIC & LEGAL ANALYSIS 11-18 (1959) (list-
ing social, economic, and political considerations that underlie application of antitrust
laws).
44. See Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 4-5 (explaining the economic and social poli-
cies Sherman Act is designed to promote).
45. See, e.g., Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163, 1168 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979) (noting that some circuits grant standing under anti-
trust law to all who fall within "target area" of conspiracy rather than requiring direct
injury); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 473 F. Supp. 382, 401 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (acknowl-
edging that the Sherman Act grants standing to all antitrust violations that injure di-
rectly and indirectly).
46. 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 1994).
1994l
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differently than domestic corporations. 47 The Act applies as long as a
"substantial, direct, and foreseeable" effect restraining American trade
or commerce exists.48
2. The Foreign Trade and Antitrust Improvements Act and Export
Trading Company Act of 1982
The Foreign Trade and Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982
("'TAIA") and the Export Trading Company Act of 1982 ("ETCA")
together comprise Public Law No. 97-290 which was enacted October
8, 1982.49 The stated legislative purpose of the ETCA is, in part, to
encourage increased export of U.S. goods and services by facilitating
the formation of export trading companies and by easing the applica-
tion of U.S. antitrust laws to certain export trade activities.5O
The FTAIA stands as a separate title within Public Law 97-290.51
Although the FTAIA does not contain an explicitly enacted legislative
purpose, as does the ETCA,52 the purposes of the FTAIA are clearly set
forth in the Act's legislative history. These purposes substantially mir-
ror the codified purpose of the ETCA. First, the FTAIA is intended to
"encourage the business community to engage in efficiency producing
47. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 276 (1927) (finding
American importers in Mexico in violation of Sherman Act); United States v. Imperial
Chem. Indus., 100 F. Supp. 504, 511 (S.D. N.Y. 1951) (determining that all violators of
antitrust laws must expect to be required to answer for their violation).
48. See Foreign Trade and Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6(a)
(1992) (providing that the Sherman Act will not apply to restraints on American for-
eign commerce unless conduct has direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable ef-
fect). See also RESTATEMENT (THURD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403 (1987) (providing that state may not apply Sherman Act to conduct of
persons having connection with another state unless that conduct has substantial, di-
rect, and foreseeable effect).
49. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 (1992); 12 U.S.C. §§ 372, 635a-4, 1841, 1843 (1982); 15
U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1992); Id. §§ 1, 6a, 45(a) (1992).
50. The purpose of the ETCA is "to increase United States exports of products and
services by encouraging more efficient provision of export trade services to United
States producers and suppliers ... and by modifying the application of the antitrust
laws to certain export trade." 15 U.S.C. § 4001 (b) (1992). This legislative purpose does
not apply to the FTAIA, which is a separate title within Public Law 97-290 with no cross
references to or use of the defined terms from the other titles.
51. The FTAIA provides:
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or
commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign na-
tions unless -(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably fore-
seeable effect -
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign
nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations...
15 U.S.C. § 6a (1992).
52. See supra note 50.
1116 [Vol. 20
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joint conduct in the export of American goods and services."53 Sec-
ond, the FTAIA is intended to amend the Sherman Act and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act to articulate a statutory test for
determining whether U.S. antitrustjurisdiction applies to certain inter-
national transactions. 54
Under section 402 of the FTAIA, the Sherman Act does not apply to
conduct involving nonimport foreign trade or commerce unless "such
conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on
domestic or import commerce. 55 Thus IIAIA was intended to exempt
from the Sherman Act export transactions that did not injure the
United States economy.56
C. The Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Antitrust Laws
The extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act has been uncertain
since its enactment 7 and courts have struggled to develop a rule of law
that is capable of uniform application.58 In an effort to overcome this
uncertainty, courts have often sought to incorporate domestic and for-
eign interests into the Act's extraterritorial reach. 59
Initially, the Court narrowly construed the extraterritorial reach of
the Sherman Act. In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,60 the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant monopolized the Central Ameri-
can banana trade by acquiring several Costa Rican and Panamanian
53. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2487.
54. Id.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(a) (1992).
56. H.R. Rep. No. 686, supra note 53.
57. See, e.g., United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 275-76 (1927) (holding
that Sherman Act jurisdiction extends to anticompetitive behavior occurring outside
the United States if conduct restrains American commerce); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (holding that the Sherman Act does not
transcend United States territory to reach anticompetitive conduct that restrains Ameri-
can trade); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1369 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1163 (1982) (holding that the Sherman Act does not reach
foreign governments that have combined to restrain American trade); United States v.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that Sherman Actjurisdiction extends
to anticompetitive conduct that intends to effect and does effect American commerce).
58. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985) (formulating balancing test of American inter-
ests against foreign interests); United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945)
(formulating effects test); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F.
Supp. 680, 688 (S.D. N.Y. 1979) (placing burden on defendant to show strength of
foreign government interest precludes Sherman Act application).
59. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98
(3d Cir. 1979) (adopting Timberlane test with modifications). But see Laker Airways Ltd.
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (contending that
courts are ill-equipped to balance foreign policy interests in antitrust suits).
60. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
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fruit distributors in violation of the Sherman Act.61 The Court held
that the Sherman Act could not reach anti-competitive conduct occur-
ring outside the jurisdiction of the United States. 62
In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that the law of the
country in which the conduct occurred would determine that con-
duct's lawfulness.63 The Court explained that any broader exercise of
jurisdiction would interfere with the sovereign authority of the foreign
country.64 In taking this view, the Court confined application of the
Act's "operation and effect to the territorial limits over which the
[American] lawmaker has general and legitimate powers."65
Subsequent to American Banana, the Court broadened the Sherman
Act's jurisdictional reach to include acts performed in foreign states,
even in the presence of foreign interests.66 In United States v. Sisal Sales
Corp.,67 the defendants allegedly monopolized the export to the
United States of sisal, a plant used to make rope, through the use of
favorable Mexican legislation and a Mexican corporation. 68 The Court
held that the Sherman Act applied because this conduct restrained
trade in the United States.69 The Court distinguished American Ba-
nana, noting that the defendants in Sisal entered into the conspiracy in
the United States. 70 In so doing, the Court effectively expanded Ameri-
can Banana's territorial limitation on the Act's reach.
7 1
61. Id. at 355-57.
62. Id. at 355.
63. Id. at 356.
64. Id.
65. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). Justice
Holmes wrote: "[w ] ords having universal scope, such as '[e] very contract in restraint of
trade,' ' [e]very person who shall monopolize,' etc., will be taken as a matter of course to
mean only every one subject to such legislation, not all that the legislator subsequently
may be able to catch." Id.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 105
(1913) (holding that agreement between American and Canadian nationals to fix
prices on transportation route from continental United States to Alaska was violation of
antitrust laws); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 189 (1911) (hold-
ing that territorial allocation agreement executed in England between American and
British nationals is subject to United States antitrust laws).
67. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
68. Id. at 273.
69. Id. at 276.
70. Id. at 275-76. In Sisal, the Court found that the bank loans and other agree-
ments that furthered the conspiracy were consummated in the United States. Id. at
272.
71. 1 HAwK, supra note 3, at 23-26 (suggesting that American Banana and Sisal Sales
are not factually distinguishable and, therefore, the latter overruled the former). The
Supreme Court has since discredited the holding in American Banana. See, e.g., Conti-
nental Ore v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) (holding that
conduct partly occurring in a foreign country does not remove conspiracy to restrain
foreign commerce of United States from Sherman Act jurisdiction).
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Of greater importance to the current state of the law is United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America72 ("Acod'). The government brought suit7 3
primarily to break Alcoa's monopoly on the U.S. aluminum trade and
to challenge alleged international arrangements of Alcoa and Alumi-
num Limited ("Limited"), a Canadian corporation. 74 Limited was
once owned by Alcoa, and a majority of Limited stock was still owned
by the same U.S. interests that controlled Alcoa.75
The Second Circuit, acting for the Supreme Court,76 articulated in
Alcoa the "effects" test for determining federal jurisdiction over foreign
companies. 7 7 Under the effects test, the United States obtains jurisdic-
tion over wholly foreign conduct only if the actors intended to restrain
U.S. commerce. 78 In addition, there must actually be an adverse effect
upon American imports or exports.79 The United States can not reach
the foreign conduct if either element is absent.80 According to the
court's analysis:
[T] he only question is whether Congress intended to impose the lia-
bility and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so; as a
court of the United States we cannot look beyond our own law. Nev-
ertheless, it is quite true that we are not to read general words, such
as those in [the Sherman] Act, without regard to the limitations cus-
tomarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers ....
We should not impute to Congress an intent to punish all whom its
courts can catch for conduct which has no consequences within the
United States.8 1
72. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
73. The United States brought the action in Alcoa under 15 U.S.C. § 4 and sought a
determination that Alcoa was monopolizing interstate and foreign commerce, particu-
larly with regard to the sale of "virgin" aluminum ingot and that Alcoa be dissolved. Id.
at 421.
74. ATWOOD & BREwsTER, supra note 12, § 6.05, at 147.
75. Id.
76. The appeal went to the Second Circuit court because the Supreme Court was
unable to achieve a quorum of six justices. See 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1992). See also ATWOOD
& BREWSTER, supra note 12, § 6.05, at 147.
77. 148 F.2d at 443. The Second Circuit accepted the district court's findings that
Alcoa and Limited were operating at arms length and that Alcoa had not participated
in the foreign arrangements that were under attack. Id. at 439-42. By doing so, the
panel narrowed the international scope of the case to the legality of Limited's participa-
tion in a cartel of European aluminum producers that imposed quotas on members'
aluminum production, including production exported to the United States. ATWOOD &
BREWSTER, supra note 12, § 6.05, at 147.
78. 148 F.2d at 443.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 443.
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In applying the effects test, the court found that the Sherman Act
reached the conduct complained of in Alcoa.82 Despite the sharp reac-
tion by foreign governments to Alcoa's effects test,8 3 American courts
have firmly concluded that the Sherman Act grants extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
8 4
In response to the criticism of Alcoa, United States courts began to
develop jurisdictional tests8 5 that incorporated the principle of "com-
ity".86 For example, the Supreme Court held in Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Cn rp.87 that "[a] conspiracy to monopolize or
restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is not
outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of the conduct
complained of occurs in foreign countries."8 8 Comity, under this ap-
proach, requires that at some point American antitrust interests are
too weak and foreign interests too strong for a U.S. court to assert
jurisdiction.8 9 By the use of this doctrine, U.S. courts hoped to effec-
82. Id. at 444-45. The court concluded that Limited's participation in the cartel
violated the Sherman Act. Id. The court further held that the intent requirement of
the effects test was met by the cartel's agreement to maintain quotas on aluminum
shipped to the United States. Id. Finally, with regard to the proven effects requirement
of the test, the court held that "[w]e think, however, that after the intent to affect im-
ports was provided, the burden of proof shifted to Limited." Id. Because the district
court found that the government had not proven an affect on imports, not that Limited
had proven the absence of an effect, this burden shift was decisive. Id.
83. See, e.g., A.D. NEAT , THE ANTrrRusT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
(365-72) (2d ed. 1970). Neale notes that obtaining jurisdiction through the service of
subpoenas becomes more difficult when the foreign companies are wholly foreign with
little or no U.S. participation in their control. Id.
84. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 610 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985).
85. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
703 (1962) (applying a balancing of foreign interests test); Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1298 (3d Cir. 1979) (adopting Timberlane approach
with modifications); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985) (adopting comity approach as one ele-
ment of three prong test).
86. The Court has defined comity as "the recognition which one nation allows
within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). See supra note 12 for a discussion of the issue of comity.
87. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
88. Id. at 704. The Continental Ore Court upheld U.S. jurisdiction over a U.S. com-
pany's Canadian subsidiary that had restrained the export sales of another U.S. com-
pany. Id. at 710.
89. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985).
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tively balance American interests against recognized foreign interests
when applying the Sherman Act.90
On another occasion, the Supreme Court held that U.S. and foreign
corporations engaged in anticompetitive behavior occurring partly
within and partly outside the United States are subject to U.S. jurisdic-
tion under the Sherman Act if the challenged behavior has an an-
ticompetitive effect in the United States.91 The Court has also held
that U.S. businesses are not free to participate in anticompetitive activ-
ity outside the United States if the conduct has an anticompetitive ef-
fect in the United States.92
Although the Court had previously considered foreign government
interests in analyzing extraterritorial jurisdiction,93 the Ninth Circuit,
in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,94 formally expanded the
effects test to include the notion of international comity. The
Timberlane facts are strikingly similar to American Banana's. Timberlane
was a United States company that, together with affiliates, attempted to
establish a lumber operation in Honduras for the purpose of export-
ing lumber to the United States.95 The existing Honduran lumber
companies were predictably upset with the prospect of additional com-
petition.96 Thus, when Timberlane attempted to enter the Honduran
lumber market through acquisition of a failing company, there was a
concerted effort to drive the company out of the country. 9
7
The Ninth Circuit held that the effects test was incomplete by itself
because "it fails to consider other nations' interests."98 The court also
held that the effects test does not "expressly take into account the full
nature of the relationship between the actors and [the United
States] ."99
The Ninth Circuit adopted a tripartite test to determine whether
courts should exercise extraterritorialjurisdiction.OO First, the alleged
restraint must affect, or have been intended to affect, the foreign com-
90. See id. at 612 (holding that courts must consider whether interests of and links
to United States are sufficiently strong vis-a-vis foreign interests to justify extension of
jurisdiction).
91. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 396 U.S. 100, 104 (1969).
92. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 563, 569 (1961).
93. See supra notes 85-92.
94. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985).
95. Id. at 604-05.
96. Id. at 604.
97. The existing firms' principal weapon against Timberlane was a refusal to settle
the debts of Timberlane's bankrupt predecessor, which Timberlane had assumed. Id.
The defendants, rather than settling the debts, obtained a court order embargoing
Timberlane's business. Id.
98. Id. at 611-12.
99. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612.
100. Id. at 613.
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merce of the United States.101 Second, if there was restraint, the con-
duct must be a cognizable violation of the Sherman Act.102 Finally, a
court should not exercise jurisdiction if doing so would be a violation
of international comity and fairness.1
03
Under the third prong of the Timberlane test, the Ninth Circuit con-
sidered whether "the interests of, and links to, the United States" were
strong enough in relation to the interests of other nations to justify
asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction.' 04 The court listed seven factors
to consider in weighing the interests of the nations involved:
1) the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or
principal places of business of corporations;
3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected
to achieve compliance;
4) the relative significance of effects on the United States as com-
pared with those elsewhere;
5) the extent to which there is an explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce;
6) the foreseeability of such effect; and
7) the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.'
0 5
The court noted that in considering foreign interests, no determina-
tion would be made regarding the validity of foreign law or policy. 106
Instead, foreign interests were presumed to be legitimate and the anal-
ysis was one of determining the relative involvement of competing in-
terests; if the interests of the United States prevailed, the court would
exercise jurisdiction.107
The Timberlane analysis was subsequently recognized by the Third
Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.108 In Mannington
Mills, the plaintiff alleged that Congoleum fraudulently secured for-
eign patents, 0 9 and that such actions violated antitrust laws if the
fraud was committed in the domestic market.11 0 Congoleum argued
that American courts could not question the validity of foreign
patents."'
101. Id. This first prong is essentially Alcoa's effects test. See supra notes 76-82.
102. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 614.
107. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615 n.34.
108. 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
109. Id. at 1290-91.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1291. Congoleum procured the patents in New Zealand, Canada, Austra-
lia, and Japan. Id. at 1290.
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Rather than undertaking a wholesale adoption of the Timberlane fac-
tors, the court developed a separate set of factors to consider in deter-
mining whether to exercisejurisdiction.1 2 The court determined that
international antitrust cases required a balancing of the interests of the
United States against those of each of the countries involved.113
The Timberlane analysis has also been adopted in other circuits.114
Moreover, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES adopted an approach similar to Timberlane's in
1987.115 However, the Mannington Mills/ Timberlane analysis has gener-
ated much confusion and criticism.11 6
One criticism is that when applying the test there is no clear interac-
tion of the three prongs.1 17 Some courts have adopted the jurisdiction
and comity analysis as separate considerations.' 18 Other courts have
treated comity as an integral part of jurisdictional determination.' 19
Another criticism is that the test is unworkable. For example, one
court has queried whether federal judges have the expertise and au-
thority to assess the importance of a foreign country's policies.
1 20
Moreover, an interested foreign state may justifiably view as suspect a
process that permits American judges to balance directly conflicting
112. Id. at 1297. The Mannington Mills court supplemented the Timberlane factors
with the following: 1) the possible effect on foreign relations should the court exercise
jurisdiction; 2) whether the party sanctioned will be forced to comply with divergent
legal standards; 3) whether the remedy would be acceptable in the United States if
issued by a foreign nation under similar circumstances states; and 4) whether there was
a treaty controlling the issue. Id.
113. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98.
114. See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d
864, 869-70 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982).
115. See supra note 18.
116. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
948-49 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that the Timberlane factors are not useful in resolving
controversy); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that the failure to apply Mannington Mills analysis was not an abuse of discretion).
117. See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of ExtraterritorialJuris-
diction, 98 HAv. L. REv. 1310, 1314 n.19 (1985) (acknowledging dispute over whether
to use balancing test when determining jurisdiction).
118. See, e.g., Industrial Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., Ltd., 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983)
(viewing balancing test as abstention doctrine rather than jurisdictional test); In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that once jurisdic-
tion is ascertained, court should use balancing test to consider whether to exercise it).
119. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1299 (3d
Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring) (arguing that comity considerations should be part
of jurisdictional determination); Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,774, at 71,789 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (interpreting comity analysis as
an integral aspect of jurisdictional test).
120. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (as-
serting that courts are ill-equipped to rule on relative importance of vital national
interests).
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national interests.12' Even ifjudges possess the requisite expertise, the
case-by-case approach necessitated by the balancing test precludes the
development of a coherent body of law.' 22 A court's failure to cau-
tiously weigh the foreign policy ramifications of exercising jurisdiction
in a sensitive manner may offend a foreign government rather than
solve the antitrust conflicts.
III. HARTFOR FIa INSURANCE Co. V. CALIFORNIA
A. Introduction
In 1988, attorneys general from nineteen states123 and a number of
private plaintiffs12 4 brought actions against several U.S. and British in-
surance companies, reinsurance companies, underwriters, insurance
brokers, private individuals, and the Insurance Services Office, Inc.
(ISO).125 The plaintiffs' charges rested on a variety of ostensible con-
spiracies, boycotts, threats, intimidation, and other coercive conduct
by the defendants that allegedly restricted the availability of certain
coverage under policies for commercial general liability (CGL) and
property insurance.l26 The actions were consolidated for litigation
and the district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.127
The district court held that the significant conflict with English law
that would result from the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
laws in this case outweighed the other factors in the comity analysis.1 28
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
121. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd., v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
953 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (asserting that proclamation byjudicial fiat that one state's interest
is more important than another's will not erase real conflict); In re Uranium Antitrust
Litig., 480 F. Supp. at 1148 (finding that American antitrust law is irreconcilable with
foreign government nondisclosure legislation).
122. See David Aronofsky, Comment, Private Antitrust Actions Against Foreign States:
Problems and Issues after International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC,
17 TEX. Ir'L L.J. 433, 472 (1982) (asserting that interests unique to each case preclude
consistent determination).
123. The states that initially filed claims were Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
124. Private plaintiffs included, among others, Ace Check Cashing, Inc., Acme Cor-
rugated Box Co., Bay Harbor Park Homeowners Association, Inc., and Big D Building
Supply Corp. Id.
125. Id. at 468. The ISO is an association of more than 1000 property and casualty
insurers, including defendants Hartford Fire Insurance Company ("Hartford"), Allstate
Insurance Company ("Allstate"), Aetna Casualty and Surety Company ("Aetna"), and
CIGNA Corporation ("CIGNA"). Id. at 468. The ISO is licensed as a rating, rate ser-
vice, and advisory organization in all fifty states. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 490.
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holding and rejected the conclusion that the principle of international
comity barred the court from exercising Sherman Act jurisdiction.129
The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the appellate court's deci-
sion regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws.13O
B. Background
The sequence of events that culminates in the purchase of reinsur-
ance 13 1 and retrocessional13 2 insurance in the London markets typi-
cally begins with the purchase of primary insurance by an individual
consumer. The primary insurer in the United States may then elect to
insure all or a portion of the underwritten risks with reinsurers in the
.K 133
The London insurance markets in which the defendants conduct
their reinsurance and retrocessional insurance business comprise un-
derwriters at Lloyd's of London, other London insurance firms
("London Company Market" firms), and brokers who obtain coverage
in these markets.13 4 The purchase and sale of insurance in London
takes place on the floor of the underwriting room at Lloyd's and in the
offices of individual insurance companies.13 5
A Lloyd's or London Company Market agent evaluates and negoti-
ates proposed insurance placements brought by brokers for considera-
129. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 934 (9th Cir. 1991).
130. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2894 (1993).
131. Reinsurance is "insurance for an insurer; a contract by which an insurer pro-
cures a third person (usually another insurance company) to insure it against loss or
liability, or a portion of such, by reason of the original insurance." BLACK'S LAw DIC-
TIONARY 1287 (6th ed. 1990).
132. Retrocessional insurance arises out of a transaction in which the primary in-
surer transfers some of the risk of insuring a party to another insurer. ROBERT H. JERRY,
II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw 683-84 (1987). Jerry further explains:
[t]he act of transferring the risk is called 'ceding,' and the portion of the risk
passed to the reinsurer is called the 'cession.' An insurer that assumes reinsur-
ance may in turn cede to another insurer a portion of the exposure reinsured.
This transaction is called a 'retrocession' and the second reinsurer is known as
a 'retrocessionaire.'
Id.
133. The form of reinsurance most pertinent to this case is known as "treaty" rein-
surance in which the reinsurance company agrees in advance to indemnify a primary
insurance company for a defined portion of the risks it accepts during the treaty period.
In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 485 (N.D. Cal. 1989). A reinsurer
does not deal directly with primary insurance consumers and may never know the iden-
tity of individual risks with the portfolio of risks included in the treaty. Excess and
Casualty Reinsurance Ass'n. v. Insurance Comm'r, 656 F.2d 491, 492, 495 (9th Cir.
1981).
134. In reInsurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp., 464, 485 (N.D. Cal. 1989). See also
Edinburgh Assurance Co. v. R.L. Burns Corp., 479 F. Supp. 138, 144 (C.D. Cal. 1979),
aff'd in part and reu'd in part on other grounds, 669 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1982).
135. Edinburg h Assurance Co., 479 F. Supp. at 147.
1994] 1125
17
Cotter: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Application of U.S. Antitrust
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WLLIAM M/TCHELL LAW REVIEW
don by the syndicate of underwriters the agent represents. 5 6 A
"slip" 137 is presented to each underwriter. 138 The responsible broker
typically circulates the slip among numerous underwriters because
many of the risks are too large to be insured by just one London mar-
ket participant.139 As a result of this spreading of risk, negotiations
over the terms and conditions on which risks will be accepted and in-
sured are integral to the functioning of the marketl40
C. Facts
In the late 1970s, ISO began to revise the industry CGL insurance14l
form. ISO filed two revised policy forms for CGL insurance with state
insurance departments in 1984.142 The proposed forms substantially
reduced the coverage previously available to insureds.143 The pro-
posed claims-made form 144 modified insurers' exposure to long tail
risks 145 and shifted the risk of future loss to insureds.' 46 The other
proposed form was a modified occurrence-based form.'4
7
136. Id.
137. A slip is a broker originated document containing the essential features of the
coverage sought. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 485.
138. Edinburgh Assurance Co., 479 F. Supp. at 145.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. CGL insurance protects insureds against the risk of liability to third parties. In
re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 468. CGL insurance is primarily purchased
by businesses, nonprofit organizations and governmental entities. Id. Hartford, All-
state, Aetna, and CIGNA are primary insurers that are principal providers of CGL insur-
ance. Id. ISO provides the policy forms upon which CGL insurance is predominately
written and on behalf of its members files standardized policy forms with state insur-
ance departments. Id. ISO also provides standardized policy forms for property and
casualty insurance that comply with state and federal regulations and will be accepted
by state insurance departments and collects historical loss data, calculates advisory rates
for insurance, and projects future loss trends. Id. at 468-69.
142. Id. at 469
143. Id. One of the forms was a "claims-made" policy under which coverage was
limited to claims made only during the policy period, regardless of when the occur-
rence giving rise to liability actually took place. Id. This represented a reduction in
coverage previously available under "occurrence-based" CGL forms which provided cov-
erage for claims arising out of occurrences during the policy period, regardless of when
the claim was eventually asserted. Id.
144. A claims made policy is one in which "the insured is indemnified for claims
made during the policy period regardless of when the acts giving rise to those claims
occur." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 807 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Appalachian Ins. Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1982)).
145. "Long tail risks" are risks that could arise long after the policy period expires.
In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 469.
146. Id.
147. An occurrence policy is one that 'provides for indemnity, regardless of when
[the] claim is made or reported, if [the] act giving rise to the claim occurred during [the]
policy period." BLAcK's LAw DicroNARY 808 (6th ed. 1990) (citingYazoo County, Miss.
v. International Surplus Lines Inc., 616 F. Supp. 153, 154 (D. Miss. 1985)).
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The proposed forms became the target of widespread debate in the
insurance industry. Opinions differ regarding what should trigger cov-
erage, whether defense costs should be limited by the proposed forms,
whether the retroactivity of the claims-made forms should be limited,
and whether various pollution exclusion provisions should be
modified.148
In the district court, the plaintiffs alleged that defendants Hartford,
Allstate, CIGNA, and Aetna engaged in a concerted effort to prohibit
the adoption of the 1984 proposed forms because the forms did not
sufficiently confine their liability or coverage limits.'49 The plaintiffs
also alleged that the defendants conspired with various domestic and
foreign reinsurance companies and underwriters to boycottis0 the pro-
posed forms unless a retroactive date was added to the claims-made
form, and a pollution exclusion and defense costs cap were added to
both forms.1 5 1
As a result of the defendants' efforts, the ISO executive committee
voted in September 1984 to establish retroactive cut-off dates in the
claims-made form, to exclude pollution coverage from both forms and
to offer an occurrence-based form in conjunction with the new claims-
made form.152 However, ISO refrained from including a defense-costs
cap in either form.153
Following this vote, ISO, together with Hartford, Aetna, and repre-
sentatives of the London reinsurance industry, undertook efforts to
promote the new forms.154 Reinsurers, for example, refused to accept
new reinsurance business and refused old business unless the primary
insurer agreed to use the claims-made form when available.' 5 5 Rein-
surers also imposed "sunset dates"' 5 6 in their policies which limited
exposure to losses that occurred after specified times on occurrence-
148. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 469.
149. Id.
150. Plaintiffs alleged that as a result of their efforts, Hartford, Allstate, Aetna, and
CIGNA, together with a variety of domestic and London reinsurers, threatened to boy-
cott North American CGL risks unless the desired changes were made to the claims-
made form and the occurrence-based form was eliminated altogether. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 469.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Sunset clauses limit the reinsurer's liability to those claims presented to it by
the primary insurer prior to a specified date. Id. at 475 n.18.
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based forms.' 5 7 They also agreed to exclude pollution liability cover-
age from reinsurance agreements. 58
As these events were occurring, ISO filed the proposed forms with
the insurance departments in all fifty states.1 59 Insurance departments
in thirty-five states subsequently held a series of public hearings, and
the proposed forms were discussed in industry and public forums.'6 0
ISO filed several revisions of the proposed forms with all fifty state in-
surance departments in response to reaction from these various ve-
nues.'61 At the conclusion of these events, 162 various states approved
the new ISO fonns,' 63 and ISO withdrew data collection efforts and
risk estimation support for the pre-1984 CGL forms.164
D. Court Holdings
1. The District Court
The district court first determined that the FTAIA165 did not apply
to the defendants' conduct.166 The court found that the plaintiffs ade-
quately alleged that a decision by the defendants to not provide rein-
surance or retrocessional reinsurance to cover certain types of risks in
the United States had a direct and substantial effect on the availability
of insurance in the United States.16 7 The court then turned to the
tripartite Timberlane test.1
68
157. Id. By including the sunset dates in the occurrence-based coverage policies,
reinsurers were effectively able to limit their liability to that which they would have been
exposed to under claims-made policy forms.
158. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 469. See generally Reinsurance
Technical Report-Law-Trying Times, Reinsurance, Feb. 1, 1994, at 25 (commenting on
the continuing controversy around pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies).
159. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 469.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. In 1986, ISO, in conjunction with some of the defendants, agreed to develop
certain standard CGL umbrella and excess policy language. Id. at 470. In June 1986,
ISO released policy language providing for a "retroactive date on claims-made policies,
a pollution exclusion, and a defense-costs cap within policy limits." Id.
163. All of the plaintiff states and two of the non-plaintiff states in which individual
plaintiffs resided approved the ISO forms with the following exceptions: New York only
approved the occurrence-based form, California and Colorado, having no procedure
for approval, took no action, and Massachusetts and NewJersey disapproved the forms.
Id. at 469.
164. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 469.
165. See supra part II.B.2.
166. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 486.
167. Id. Cf McGlinchy v. Shell Oil Co., 845 F.2d 802, 815 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding
no direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on United States commerce
where agreements involved orders for products in Southeast Asia and other areas
outside the United States).
168. For a discussion of the Timberlane factors see supra notes 93-107 and accompa-
nying text.
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Regarding the first two prongs, the court determined that allega-
tions that the defendants' conduct had a direct effect in the United
States were sufficient to establish jurisdiction under Timberlane.169 The
court then addressed the third prong and focused the analysis on
"whether 'the contacts and interests of the United States are sufficient
to support the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.' "170
The court placed heavy emphasis on the first factor under the third
prong,171 holding that "enforcement of the antitrust laws against activi-
ties in the London reinsurance market would lead to significant con-
flict with English law and policy."t 72 Therefore,jurisdiction should not
be exercised. 173 The court subsequently entered judgment on behalf
of all the defendants and dismissed all pending federal claims.174
2. The Court of Appeals
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's con-
clusion that the FTAIA "is no bar to any of the plaintiffs' claims."1 75
However, the court ultimately reversed the district court by finding
that while the conflict with longstanding British policy on the under-
writing of insurance pointed toward abstention, the remaining factors
under Timberlane's third prong pointed toward the appropriateness of
exercising jurisdiction.176 The court finally noted that the Timberlane
169. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 486-87.
170. Id. at 487.
171. The first factor is the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy. Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
3514 (1985).
172. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 489.
173. Id. at 489. With regard to the remaining six factors under the third prong, the
court found:
1) that the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations of princi-
pal places of business of the corporations weighed against the exercise of
jurisdiction;
2) that the improbability of enforcement of an eventual judgment "tip[ped]
slightly against the exercise ofjurisdiction;"
3) that the conduct of the defendants had a significant enough effect in the
United States, as compared with effects elsewhere, "to make this factor weigh
in favor of the exercise ofjurisdiction;"
4) that plaintiffs' allegations that defendants' purpose was to restrict the avail-
ability of certain types of CGL insurance was not inconsistent with the exist-
ence of a legitimate business purpose for their actions, and thus this factor
weighed against the exercise of jurisdiction;
5) the defendants conceded that the factor of foreseeability of the effect in
the United States of their conduct weighed in favor ofjurisdiction; and
6) that although the activities within the United States were not insignificant,
their significance derived from the alleged foreign agreements. Thus this fac-
tor was considered to be neutral.
Id. at 489-90.
174. Id. at 491.
175. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932 (9th Cir. 1991).
176. Id. at 922. With regard to the remaining six factors, the court held:
1994] 1129
21
Cotter: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: The Application of U.S. Antitrust
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILUAM M/TCFIELL LAW REVIEW
comity factors indicate that jurisdiction must be exercised when found
to exist.17
7
3. The Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit by
holding that U.S. antitrust laws apply to foreign conduct that is meant
to produce, and does produce, a substantial effect in the United
States.178 Justice Souter began the majority's analysis by noting that
the British defendants conceded Sherman Act jurisdiction over their
London-based conduct.1 79 Further,Justice Souter noted that because
this issue arose pursuant to a motion to dismiss, allegations that the
defendants engaged in conduct intended to have, and resulting in, a
substantial effect on the U.S. insurance market must be presumed to
be true.' 8 0
The majority opinion recognized the "well established [rule] ... that
the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce
and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United
States."1 81 Justice Souter noted that when enacting the FTAIA, Con-
gress declined to express a view on whether a court with Sherman Act
jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise that jurisdiction on the
grounds of international comity.1 8 2 The majority declined to reach
that question because even assuming that a court might properly de-
1) that the presence of American plaintiffs, many American defendants, and
some American subsidiaries pointed towards the exercise of jurisdiction;
2) that substantial compliance could be achieved and thus this factor weighed
in favor of jurisdiction;
3) the actions of the foreign defendants had "real economic consequences"
for the American economy that strongly weighed in favor of the exercise of
jurisdiction;
4) that the defendants' conduct was intended to have effects in the United
States and thus this factor strongly weighed in favor of jurisdiction; and
5) that as the effects of the defendants' conduct were intended and substan-
tial, their foreseeability became a strong factor favoring the exercise of
jurisdiction.
The appellate court did not consider the last Timberlane factor: the relative importance
of the conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. Id. at 932-
34.
177. Id. at 934.
178. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2910 (1993). The Court
also held that domestic insurers did not lose their McCarran-Ferguson Act immunity
from federal regulation simply because they agreed or acted with foreign reinsurers
allegedly not regulated by state law. I. at 2903.
179. Id. at 2909. The British defendants contended, however, that the district court
should have declined to exercise jurisdiction under the principles of international com-
ity, Id. "Our position is not that the Sherman Act does not apply... Our position is that
there are certain circumstances, and that this is one of them, in which the interests of
another state are sufficient that the exercise of jurisdiction should be restrained". Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2910.
1130 [Vol. 20
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss4/6
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
cline to exercise Sherman Actjurisdiction, "international comity would
not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the circumstances alleged
here."183
The Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's exercise of jurisdiction by
finding that there was no conflict between U.S. and British law.184 The
Court reached this perfunctory conclusion despite the British defend-
ants' argument that a conflict arose because the challenged conduct
was consistent with British law and policy.185
The Court held that a true conflict does not exist "where a person
subject to regulation by two states can comply with the laws of both."186
In this case, the London-based reinsurers did not argue that British law
required them to act in a manner prohibited by U.S. law, nor did they
argue that compliance with the laws of both countries would be impos-
sible.187 Thus, there existed no true conflict and no consequential
need to consider whether U.S. courts should decline to exercise juris-
diction on the basis of international comity.1sS
In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that any nation having a basis for
jurisdiction must refrain from exercising that jurisdiction if such an
exercise would be unreasonable.' 89 According to Justice Scalia:
Rarely would these factors point more clearly against application of
United States Law .... I think it unimaginable that an assertion of
legislative jurisdiction by the United States would be considered rea-
sonable, and therefore it is inappropriate to assume, in the absence
of statutory indication, that Congress has made such an assertion.' 90
Justice Scalia argued that the majority "completely misinter-
preted"191 section 403 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES. He characterized the majority's
holding that no true conflict exists "unless compliance with United
States law would constitute a violation of another country's law" as a
183. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
184. Id. at 2911.
185. Id. at 2910. The defendants, together with the British government which ap-
peared as amicus curiae, argued that Parliament had established a comprehensive regu-
latory regime for London's reinsurance market and that the defendants' conduct in
this case was consistent with that established law and policy. Id.
186. Id. at 2910 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403 cmt. e (1987)).
187. Id. at 2911.
188. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2911. "We have no need in this case to address other
considerations that might inform a decision to refrain from the exercise ofjurisdiction
on grounds of international comity." Id.
189. Id. at 2921 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 403(1) (1987)).
190. 113 S. Ct. at 2921. Legislative jurisdiction refers to "[tie sphere of authority of
a legislative body to enact laws and to conduct all business incidental to its law-making
function." BLACK'S LAw DIcriONARY 900 (6th ed. 1990).
191. Id. at 2922.
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"breathtakingly broad proposition."19 2 The dissent predicted that the
majority's holding will "bring the Sherman Act and other laws into
sharp and unnecessary conflict with the legitimate interests of other
foreign countries-particularly our closest trading partners." 93
IV. ANAL'sis
A. Effect of Court's Holding
Rather than using Hartford as an opportunity to clarify the complexi
ties of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the Court's decision is instead an-
other contribution to the confusion and perplexity present in this area
of law. Hartford's result leaves several important questions unanswered,
has several significant consequences, and fails to set out a clear test to
determine jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
1. Questions Unanswered
First, the majority noted that the FTAIA was intended to exempt
from the Sherman Act export transactions that did not injure U.S. com-
merce.' 94 The Court stated that the FTAIA's application to the chal-
lenged conduct was unclear given that the lower courts characterized
the conduct as a limitation on the import of insurance into the United
States.1 95 However, the majority held that that question did not need
to be addressed because, even assuming that the FTAIA did apply, the
requirement of a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect"
on U.S. commerce was "plainly [met]" in this case.' 9 6 Thus, questions
remain as to what transactions the FTAIA actually applies to and
whether Hartfords result would have been different had the FTAIA
been found inapplicable in this case.
Second, the majority also failed to address whether the Court should
ever decline to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds of international
comity.197 This issue was also not addressed when Congress enacted
the FTAIA.198 Under the Court's analysis, a U.S. court has jurisdiction
over "foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact pro-
duce some substantial effect in the United States."199 However, if such
an effect is present, a true conflict between U.S. and foreign law
192. Id. at 2921-22.
193. Id. at 2922.
194. Id. at 2909 n.23.
195. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2909 n.23.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 2910.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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should serve as the basis for consideration as to whether comity re-
quires abstention from the exercise ofjurisdiction.200
A true conflict arises, for example, where foreign law requires a de-
fendant to act in a manner prohibited by U.S. law or when compliance
with both the laws of the United States and the defendant's country is
impossible. However, a true conflict actually arises in few instances. In
many cases, the conduct at issue has been consistent with, permitted,
encouraged, or otherwise approved by foreign law, and compliance
with U.S. law has not been a violation of foreign law.201 Thus, absent a
true conflict, Hartford leaves open the question of whether and, if so,
under what circumstances international comity requires a U.S. court to
abstain from exercising jurisdiction.
This ambiguity has significant implications. In April 1992, the U.S.
Department of Justice announced a new effort to attack conduct
outside the United States that restrains U.S. exports, regardless of that
conduct's lawfulness in the foreign jurisdiction.2O2 This policy was re-
portedly the result of a then-recently appointed antitrust division assis-
tant attorney general's decision to more aggressively pursue such
conduct.203 By failing to delineate when a true conflict arises, the Hart-
ford decision may further encourage private plaintiffs, state attorneys
general, and U.S. government enforcement agencies to pursue con-
duct outside the United States that is otherwise lawful.
2. Consequences
One important consequence of Hartford involves "blocking stat-
utes"204 and intergovernmental negotiations. 205 One can reasonably
expect that foreign governments, enforcement authorities, and courts
will use such measures to defend what they perceive to be their legiti-
200. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 608-12 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985).
201. See, e.g., Continental Ore v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707
(1962); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 1982); Mannington
Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979).
202. Justice Department Will Challenge Foreign Restraints on U.S. Exports Under
Antitrust Laws, 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 50,804 (April 3, 1992). See alsoJoseph P.
Griffin, New U.S. Enforcement Policy is Assessed, NAT'L L.J. March 16, 1992, at 23.
203. Rich Jaroslovsky, Talking Tough, WALL ST. J. July 2, 1993, at Al.
204. For example, the British Parliament enacted the Protection of Trading Inter-
ests Act in 1980. This act generally prohibits enforcement by U.K. courts of certain
foreign judgments. Protection of Trading Interests Act of 1980 and Exchange of Diplo-
matic Notes Concerning the Act, ch. 11, reprinted in 21 INrr'L. LEGAL MATEmIALS 834
(1982).
205. For example, after the Justice Department announced its change in antitrust
policy, Japanese government officials announced that Japan believed the U.S. policy
violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Japanese Trade Ministry to Study
Plan by US. to Extend External Reach of Antitrust Law, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA)
1560, at 479 (April 9, 1992).
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mate sovereign interests when confronted with such aggressive behav-
ior by U.S. plaintiffs.
Another important consequence of Hartford is the effect on the
Timberlane abstention factors included in the balancing test for deter-
mining an exercise of jurisdiction.20 6 Hartford provided the Court's
first opportunity to comment on Timberlands analysis. In refusing to
comment on Timberlane, the Court stated only that there was no need
to discuss other considerations that may have affected the Hartford de-
cision.207 This statement suggests, at least by implication, that the
Timberlane analysis survives. Yet, by not applying the Timberlane factors
to the challenged conduct, the Court left unanswered the question of
whether Timberlane has the support of the Court and, if so, how the
Court would apply the factors.
Equally ambiguous is whether the Timberlane analysis for extraterrito-
rial application of antitrust laws has been superseded by the FTAIA.208
However, in analyzing Hartford, the Court did not acknowledge that
the FTAIA superseded Timberlane, nor did it embrace the Timberlane
test. The Court merely found that nothing in the FTAIA precluded
jurisdiction over the British reinsurers. 209
3. Failure to State Test
Finally, and perhaps most significant, the Supreme Court failed to
define the test for determining jurisdiction over foreign corporations.
Because the London reinsurers failed to argue that British law re-
quired them to act in some fashion prohibited by U.S. law, the Court
merely decided that there was no conflict of law.21O The Hartford deci-
sion thus leaves future litigants with no clearer framework within which
to analyze the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Hartford afforded the Court the opportunity to shed light on the cur-
rent state of the law controlling extraterritorial jurisdiction. By not
identifying when a true conflict of law arises or when international
comity militates against exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction, the
Court left more questions unanswered than solved. Given the poten-
tial for international concern regarding this decision,21l a better analy-
206. See supra notes 94-107 and accompanying text.
207. "We have no need in this case to address other considerations that might in-
form a decision to refrain from the exercise ofjurisdiction on grounds of international
comity." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2911 (1993).
208. The FTAIA arguably codifies the standard for determining whether there is
extraterritorial jurisdiction for all cases, not only those involving export transactions.
See In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 486 n.28 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
209. See supra part III.D.3.
210. Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2911.
211. See, e.g., Lloyd's List, USA: London Reinsurance Market May Face US Legal
Interference After Court Ruling, July 6, 1993 (noting that Court's decision to exert
extraterritorial jurisdiction puts the U.S. and Britain on a collision course).
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sis would have recognized Timberlane as the controlling standard and
would have fully developed each Timberlane factor.
B. Suggestions and Recommendations
There are a number of compelling reasons why the Supreme Court
should have analyzed Hartford under Timberlane's framework. First,
while many of the circuit courts have fully analyzed and developed
Timberlane's factors, 21 2 the Court has never addressed the standard.
The Court had the opportunity to clarify Timberlane's legitimacy and
applicability to extraterritorial cases. Second, development and analy-
sis of Timberlane's factors would have provided guidance for current
and prospective litigants, as well as foreign businesses making decisions
that may ultimately have an effect in U.S. markets. Finally, Timberlane
is also the most exhaustive jurisdictional test. Given the fact that for-
eign policy concerns are fundamental to the question of extraterritoral
jurisdiction, jurisdictional analysis warrants focused judicial attention
to these concerns by means of the Timberlane test.
Because the Court neither embraced nor overruled Timberlane, one
may reasonably assume that Timberlane survives the Hartford decision
and remains the majority rule for deciding similar cases. However, be-
cause the Court failed to analyze each prong, future litigants have no
greater understanding regarding how to present extraterritorial cases.
The following analysis applies the Timberlane factors to Hartford's facts
to provide further insight into interpreting the Timberlane standard.213
1. The First Timberlane Prong: The Effect on U.S. Commerce
The first Timberlane prong requires that the alleged restraint affect,
or be intended to affect, the foreign commerce of the United States.214
In Timberlane, the court intended this element to be less demanding
than the formal effects test articulated in Alcoa,215 which requires a
212. See supra notes 108-122 and accompanying text.
213. Alternatively, litigants and businesses confronted with extraterritorial jurisdic-
tional questions may also look to Hartfords dissent, because the dissent is more com-
plete in analyzing the international comity issues. Although Justice Scalia uses the
factors set forth in § 403 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE FORIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES to determine whether the notion of international comity would
require abstention in this case, his analysis is helpful in determining how this case
might have been decided had the Court chosen to utilize Timberlane's framework. The
analysis is helpful because Justice Scalia chose to perform an indepth analysis of the
case rather than merely follow the majority's path of citing procedural deficiencies as a
basis for the holding.
214. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985).
215. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of Alcoa's effects
test.
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showing of "substantial effect" at the first stage of the analysis. 216 As
long as there was some effect on U.S. commerce, there was sufficient
basis for moving to the next prong of the test.
217
This test is disposed of with relative ease when applied to Hartford.
The plaintiffs' allegations of conspiracy and restraint of trade, com-
bined with the fact that the defendants intended these results,218 show
that there was some effect on U.S. commerce as a result of the defend-
ants' actions. Thus, the first Timberlane prong is satisfied under these
facts.
2. The Second Timberlane Prong: Whether the Restraint is a
Violation of U.S. Antitrust Laws
The second Timberlane prong addresses whether the alleged restraint
is of the type and magnitude to constitute a violation of U.S. antitrust
law. This prong turns on the substantive scope of the Sherman Act
rather than on the Act's territorial reach.219 This element of the test is
jurisdictional only in that the court cannot hear the complaint if the
complaint fails to allege a substantive claim under the Sherman Act.
To satisfy this prong, then, a plaintiff has what appears to be the
relatively easy task of establishing a substantive violation of the Sher-
man Act. As proof of this point, the district court in Hartford disposed
of this element with one sentence in holding that the plaintiffs' allega-
tions established a direct effect in the United States and provided suffi-
cient foundation for that court's Sherman Act jurisdiction.22o The
216. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
217. Id. Although other courts have not addressed this lower standard, both the
Uranium and Mannington Mills courts have indicated a preference for the higher Alcoa
standard. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255 (7th Cir. 1980); Man-
nington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 (3rd Cir. 1979). For an
excellent discussion of these different approaches, see ATwooD & BREWSTER, supra note
12, § 6.14, at 166 (1st ed. 1961).
218. See supra part III.C for a detailed discussion of the facts of Hartford.
219. The Timberlane court cited two sources which indicate that the magnitude of an
effect is an issue of substantive law rather than jurisdiction. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613
(citing Occidential Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
950 (1972) (noting confusion regarding the extent to which restraints must affect com-
merce); Michael F. Beausang, The ExtraterritorialJurisdiction of the Sherman Act, 70 DIc-
L. REv. 187, 191 (1966) (stating that "a direct and substantial 'effect' is necessary for
Sherman Act violations") (emphasis in original)). Further, the Court, in restating this
prong, indicated that the question is whether "[the alleged restraint] is... of such a
type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act," thus
indicating that the second element is more substantive in nature. Timberlane, 549 F.2d
at 615.
220. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 486 (N.D. Cal. 1989). Specifi-
cally, the court held that the FTAIA was no bar to the plaintiffs' conduct. Id. The court
noted that "[t]he subject matter of the [defendants'] alleged agreement, however, con-
cerned the provision of reinsurance within the United States, and the allegations of
(Vol. 20
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Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision merely by holding
that "the FTAIA is no bar to any of the plaintiffs' claims."221 The
Supreme Court held that "it is well established ... that the Sherman
Act applies to conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact pro-
duce some substantial effect in the United States."222
Given the minimal requirements of this element and the fact that
the district and appeal courts found for the plaintiff on this element
on the basis of mere allegations, this is the least difficult Timberlane
prong to satisfy. Litigants will be wise to focus less attention here and
concentrate on the more important balancing test required under the
third prong.
3. The Third Timberlane Prong: The Balancing Test
The final Timberlane prong is the most important.223 Under this test,
the question is "whether the interests of, and the links to, the United
States-including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign
commerce-are sufficiently strong vis-a-vis those of other nations, to
justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority."224
This balancing process must be an integral part of any jurisdictional
analysis. This is exemplified by Timberlands own use of a seven-factor
balancing test as a partial substitute for much of Alcoa's effects test.2 25
The importance of this process is also supported by common sense-
each nation's interests deserve close judicial scrutiny and
consideration.
The remainder of this section presents a fact-specific analysis of Hart-
ford under Timberlands balancing test. Future litigants must recognize
that Timberlane's is a fact specific test that demands a case-by-case analy-
sis of the relative weight of each of the test's factors. Different facts may
result in more or less weight being apportioned to each factor.
effects in United States markets are sufficient to preclude [application of the FTAIA]."
Id. By finding that the effects of the defendants' conduct were sufficient to preclude
application of the FTAIA, the district court impliedly found that the defendants' con-
duct met the Sherman Act's "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable" test. Id.
(citing McGlinchy v. Shell Oil Co., 845 F.2d 802, 815 (9th Cir. 1988)).
221. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 932 (9th Cir. 1991).
222. Hartford Fire. Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 (1993) (citations
omitted). "Such is the conduct alleged here: that the London reinsurers engaged in
unlawful conspiracies to affect the market for insurance in the United States and that
their conduct in fact produced some substantial effect." Id. (footnote omitted).
223. ATwooD & BREWSrER, supra note 12, § 6.10, at 161 (2d ed. 1981) ("The most
important element of [ Timberlane's] test [is] the third, the balancing process...").
224. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 3514 (1985).
225. Id. at 611-613.
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a. Degree of Conflict with Foreign Law or Policy
The first factor under Timberlane's third prong requires a balancing
of the conflicts, if any, that exist between each sovereign's law and pol-
icy.22 6 As previously mentioned, London has a long and well-estab-
lished policy of regulating its insurance and reinsurance markets.
227
However, the United States also has an established tradition of anti-
trust laws. The evidence of conflict between U.S. antitrust laws and
English insurance law and policy is substantial.2
2s
On balance, enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws against activities that
took place wholly within London's well-regulated reinsurance market
would lead to significant conflict with English law and policy. The
Hartford Court would have thus been prohibited from exercising juris-
diction based on the first factor under the third prong.
b. The Nationality or Allegiance of the Parties and the Locations
of Principal Places of Business
Under the third prong's second factor, a court weighs the burden, if
any, that adjudication in U.S. courts would place on the litigants. To
determine this, the court looks at the nationality, allegiance, and the
location of the parties' principal places of business.
2 29
All the plaintiffs in Hartford were located in the United States.
Although some of the defendants were located in England and were of
English nationality, many of the corporate defendants were subsidiar-
ies of American corporations. 23o
However, adjudication of this case would have required testimony of
witnesses and the production and analysis of documents located pri-
marily in England. Thus, the nationality or allegiance of the parties
and the locations of the defendants' principal places of businesses
would likely weigh against the exercise of jurisdiction.
c. The Extent to Which Enforcement by Either State Can Be
Expected to Achieve Compliance
Under this factor, a court examines whether there are significant
barriers that would preclude enforcement of a judgment against the
defendant.231
226. Id. at 614.
227. See supra part III.B.
228. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 946
(D.C. Cir. 1984).
229. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
230. For an exhaustive list of Hartfords plaintiffs and defendants, see In re Insurance
Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. 464, 491 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (Appendix). There are over 90
parties listed. Id.
231. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
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In Hartford, there were a number of barriers that would have affected
an American court's ability to enforce a judgment against the English
defendants. For example, the British Parliament has enacted blocking
statutes that prohibit enforcement of certain foreign judgments by
U.K. courts, and allow the British Secretary of State for Industry to for-
bid British nationals to comply with foreign antitrust judgments.232
Although Hartfords plaintiffs would be entitled to collect on an even-
tual judgment against the defendants' assets located in the United
States, these blocking statutes would render enforcement of the plain-
tiffs' requested injunctive relief in England improbable. Thus, ex-
pected compliance weighed against an exercise of jurisdiction.
d. The Relative Significance of Effects on the United States as
Compared with Those Elsewhere
Under the third prong's fourth factor, a court weighs the effect, if
any, that the defendant's alleged conduct will have in the United States
against the effect, if any, elsewhere. 23 3 The plaintiffs in Hartford al-
leged that half of the reinsurance business at issue covered risks under-
taken in North America. 23 4
The plaintiffs did not allege, however, what percentage of those risks
involved U.S. CGL policies that were the subject of the case. Moreover,
the plaintiffs did not allege the effects that the defendants' retroces-
sional reinsurance agreements would have had in U.S. markets. None-
theless, the defendants' conduct would have had a sufficient impact in
the United States so as to make this factor weigh in favor of ajurisdic-
tional exercise.
e. The Extent to Which There is an Explicit Purpose to Harm or
Affect United States Commerce
Under this factor, a court determines whether there is explicit intent
to affect or harm U.S. commerce through the defendant's conduct.235
If there is intent, this element may still not weigh against the defend-
ant if the defendant can show a legitimate business purpose for the
conduct.
The conduct of the Hartford defendants was aimed primarily at re-
ducing the defendants' exposure to certain risks and controlling
losses, both of which are legitimate business purposes. 236 The fact that
the defendants intended to restrict various types of insurance cover-
232. See supra note 204 and accompanying text for a discussion of blocking statutes.
233. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
234. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 489.
235. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
236. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 490.
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age, therefore, is not inconsistent with a legitimate business pur-
pose.23 7 Thus, this factor weighed against an exercise of jurisdiction.
f Foreseeability of Such Effect
Under this factor, a court examines the extent to which the defend-
ants were aware of the potential effects their behavior would have on
U.S. markets.23 8 In Hartford, the defendants were obviously aware of
the potential effects their conduct would have in the United States.
Indeed, the defendants conceded this point at trial.2 39 Thus, the fac-
tor of foreseeability weighed in favor of an exercise of jurisdiction.
g. The Relative Importance to the Violations Charged of Conduct
Within the United States as Compared with Conduct
Abroad
Under this last factor, a court weighs the significance that actions
taken by the defendants in the United States have against actions taken
elsewhere. 240 Based on the attention this factor received at the trial
court level, litigants would be wise to thoroughly address this factor.
The Hartford defendants were alleged to have coerced primary insur-
ers in the United States and to have communicated with ISO in an
effort to have the occurrence form rejected.241 The district court
found that although these activities were not insignificant, they derived
their significance from agreements undertaken in London.242 Conse-
quently, the district court held that the relative importance of the con-
duct within the United States as compared to conduct abroad must be
considered neutral with respect to an exercise ofjurisdiction.243
However, the alleged activities in the United States were incidental
to the agreement that occurred in London and this agreement was the
gravamen of the action. The resulting U.S. activities were less signifi-
cant when compared with those that took place in London, thus this
factor should have ultimately weighed against an exercise of
jurisdiction.
On the basis of this analysis, one may reasonably conclude that an
exercise ofjurisdiction in this case would result in a conflict with estab-
lished English law and policy. Moreover, this conflict was not miti-
gated by the existence of other factors that would support such an
exercise. Consequently, had the Supreme Court chosen to analyze this
case by applying the Timberlane test rather than merely relying on a
237. Id.
238. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
239. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 490.
240. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
241. In re Insurance Antitrust Litig., 723 F. Supp. at 490.
242. Id.
243. Id.
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procedural deficiency,244 the Court would have rejected the exercise
of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
V. CONCLUSION
Hartford illustrates the inadequacy and continued confusion in ex-
isting approaches to determining whether courts should exercise juris-
diction in cases involving foreign activities. Unfortunately, the Hartford
decision is of little probative value in the area of extraterritorial juris-
diction. The decision leaves more questions unanswered than resolved
because the Supreme Court failed to define a test for determinigjuris-
diction over foreign corporations.
Future litigants would be wise to force the Court to resolve the ques-
tions left unanswered in Hartford by continuing to raise the issues ad-
dressed in Timberlane. However, until the Court addresses these issues
directly, current and prospective litigants, as well as multi-national
businesses whose conduct may ultimately affect U.S. markets, will have
to base their decisionmaking on the current state of confusion and
disarray in the area of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Jeffrey L. Cotter
244. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2911 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the majority decision was based primarily on a determination
that no conflict existed between the laws of England and the United States).
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